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Abstract—This paper presents a preliminary flight test based
detection range versus false alarm performance characterisation
of a morphological-hidden Markov model filtering approach
to vision-based airborne dim-target collision detection. On
the basis of compelling in-flight collision scenario data, we
calculate system operating characteristic (SOC) curves that
concisely illustrate the detection range versus false alarm rate
performance design trade-offs. These preliminary SOC curves
provide a more complete dim-target detection performance
description than previous studies (due to the experimental
difficulties involved, previous studies have been limited to very
short flight data sample sets and hence have not been able to
quantify false alarm behaviour). The preliminary investigation
here is based on data collected from 4 controlled collision
encounters and supporting non-target flight data. This study
suggests head-on detection ranges of approximately 2.22 km
under blue sky background conditions (1.26 km in cluttered
background conditions), whilst experiencing false alarms at a
rate less than 1.7 false alarms/hour (ie. less than once every 36
minutes). Further data collection is currently in progress.
Keywords-collision; detection; false alarm; hidden Markov
model; morphology; vision;
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine vision and dim-target image processing tech-
niques have been previously suggested by many authors
as potential tools for addressing detection aspects of the
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) airborne collision avoid-
ance problem (which is also known as the sense-and-
avoid problem) [1], [2]. Compared to other sensing options
(such as radar), machine vision sensors are relatively low
cost and have minimal size, weight, and power (SWaP)
footprints, allowing them to remain feasible even in small
to medium class UAVs. In addition to their SWaP ad-
vantages, machine vision offers a non-cooperative sensing
approach that does not rely on transponders or other special
equipment to be installed on other aircraft (cooperative
approaches like the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS) require cooperative radio communications
via onboard transponders [3]). Furthermore, the parallels be-
tween machine vision and human vision can be an advantage
in gaining future regulatory approval, given the focus of
current standards on equivalence with human see-and-avoid
capabilities [4], [5].
Over the last three decades, a two-stage processing
paradigm has emerged for detection of dim, sub-pixel sized
targets [6]–[10]. These two stages are: 1) an image pre-
processing stage that highlights potential targets with spatial
attributes of interest (within a single frame); and 2) a
temporal filtering stage that exploits target dynamics across
a sequence of image frames.
The principle objective of the image pre-processing stage
is to suppress non-target features within the image such
as background noise and clutter. Image morphology has
become one of the most prevalent pre-processing approaches
in the dim-target detection problem [11]–[13] (specific im-
plementations include the Hit-or-Miss filter [14], the Close-
Minus-Open filter [15], and the Top-Hat filter [16]). Admit-
tedly, early image morphology applications were focused
on the detection of small target in infrared (IR) images
[17]–[19]. However, much of the recent image morphology
research activity has related to the problem of dim-target
detection in the context of visual spectrum systems [6]–[8],
[20], [21].
Following the image pre-processing stage, the temporal
filtering stage attempts to highlight or extract image fea-
tures exhibiting target-like temporal evolution across suc-
cessive image frames (using track-before-detect filtering
approaches). Two basic temporal filtering approaches have
been well studied within the dim-target tracking community:
Viterbi based approaches [7], [9], [10], [22], [23], and
Bayesian based approaches [6], [21], [22], [24]–[26]. An
explanation of the difference between the two paradigms is
provided in [26], with performance comparisons provided
in [21], [22] (on the basis of synthetic computer generated
data).
Efforts to characterise the performance of dim-target
detection techniques on the basis of real target data have
continued over the last few years [6], [20], [27]–[30]. In [20],
[27], [28], dim-target detection techniques were applied to
data sets collected from ground based sensors; these data
sets illustrated the basic feasibility of image based dim-
target detection. In [6], [29], [30], practical in-flight airborne
dim-target detection (that is, detection on the basis of an
imaging sensor onboard an aircraft) was demonstrated in
a limited number of test cases. These test cases illustrated
the importance of imaging sensor stability in dim-target
detection, which is a significant challenge in the airborne
environment due to platform vibrations and unpredictable
aerodynamic disturbances. However, long-term false alarm
analysis (over data sets more than just a few hundred
image frames in length) and performance trade-offs were
not addressed in this work.
More recently, a direct comparison study between the
Viterbi and Bayesian based temporal filtering approaches
was made on the basis of image sequences collected during
staged UAV-on-UAV mid-air collision course experiments
[6]. This UAV collision course study suggested that both
dim-target detection approaches offered similar detection
range performance; however, the collected data sets were not
extensive enough to allow proper evaluation of false alarm
performance statistics (although some partial evidence about
false alarm susceptibility was provided).
Together, these previous studies have demonstrated the
basic feasibly of using image based dim-target detection
techniques for the airborne collision avoidance problem, but
these studies have also highlighted that false alarm perfor-
mance is an important issue that is yet to be appropriately
characterised. It is also worth highlighting that the collection
of collision engagement data is not straightforward and typ-
ically requires specialised equipment and careful planning
[6], [29], [30].
The key contribution of this paper is to provide the
first credible assessment of vision based dim-target airborne
collision detection systems through the evaluation of two key
system operating characteristics: detection range and false
alarm rate. This is performed using airborne flight test data,
and we present our results in terms of system operating
characteristic (SOC) curves that illustrate important trade-
off relationships between detection range and false alarm
rate. The calculated SOC curves provide the first systematic
characterisation of false alarm performance of an airborne
dim-target detection system.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section II
we will present a description of the vision-based dim-
target airborne detection approach examined in this paper
(the morphological-hidden Markov model (morphological-
HMM) approach). In Section III, we describe our data
collection and analysis approach and present our system op-
erating characteristic (SOC) curves. Some brief concluding
remarks are provided in Section IV.
II. DIM TARGET DETECTION APPROACH
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the detection and
false alarm performance of a candidate dim-target vision
based airborne collision detection system. The candidate
system under evaluation is the morphological-HMM dim-
target detection approach (a Bayesian approach) [6], [21],
[24], [31]. This dim-target detection approach involves two
processing stages: 1) a morphological image pre-processing
stage, followed by 2) a track-before-detect hidden Markov
model temporal filtering stage. The calculations involved
in each stage are highly parallelizable, and previous stud-
ies have exploited graphics processing unit (GPU) based
hardware to realise real-time execution performance (in [6],
unoptimised implementations of the morphological-HMM
algorithm can process 1024-by-768 pixel images at up to
30 frames per second). More detail on the two processing
stages is given in the following sections.
A. Morphological Image Pre-Processing
In [6], a Close-Minus-Open (CMO) morphological filter-
ing stage was used to simultaneously detect both positively
contrasting (brighter than background) and negatively con-
trasting (darker than background) features within an image.
However, it has been suggested that airborne aircraft threats
are nearly always darker than the background sky [28].
For this reason, in this study, we have implemented an
image pre-processing stage based on bottom-hat morpho-
logical filtering [32], which is designed to highlight only
negative-contrast features within an image. A directional
decomposition technique [15] is exploited in a manner
similar to [21], [24], whereby filtering in the horizontal and
vertical directions are performed independently using 1D
row and column structuring elements (structuring elements
5 pixels in length were used in our implementation). The
minimum of the horizontal and vertical response on a pixel
by pixel basis is taken as the final morphological filter
output.
B. Track-before-detect hidden Markov model Temporal Fil-
tering
The HMM temporal filtering stage of the candidate dim-
target detection approach assumes that, if present, the target
resides within (and evolves over) a set of discrete 2D grid
points or pixel locations { ( i, j )| 1 ≤ i ≤ Nv, 1 ≤ j ≤ Nh},
where there are Nv vertical and Nh horizontal locations
in the image. Each pixel location (i, j) is interpreted as a
unique state of the HMM, which can be indexed by the
single index value m = [( j − 1 )Nv + i] ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
(corresponding to the column stack operation applied to the
image grid).
We now repeat the model construction that is provided
in [6] (an alternative model description is also provided in
[31]). Let xk denote the HMM state that is active at time
k. Between consecutive image frames, the target may move
between different pixel locations (or equivalently, transition
between different HMM state values). The probability of
transition between different HMM states will be described
by the transition probabilities matrix A, where the mnth el-
ement Amn = P (xk+1 = state m|xk = state n) describes
the probability of moving from a pixel position (state) n to
any other pixel position (state) m. In this airborne collision
detection problem, transition probabilities will be used to
describe the expected mean target motion in the image
plane (and we remind that motion in the image plane is
not directly equivalent to motion in the real world). We will
let initial probabilities be denote by the vector pi, where
the mth element pim = P (x1 = state m) for 1 ≤ m ≤ N
describes the target’s probability of initially being located
in state m. Finally, we will let measurement probabilities
B
m (Yk) = P (Yk|xk = state m) for 1 ≤ m ≤ N
define the probability of the observed image measurement
Yk ∈ R
Nv×Nh , given that the target is at pixel location
(or HMM state) m (see [33] for more details about the
parameterisation of HMMs).
In this airborne detection application, as argued in [24],
we can calculate Bm using the following relationship be-
tween target location xk and the pre-processed measure-
ments Yk:
B
m (Yk) =
P (Ym
k
|xk = state m)
P (Ym
k
|xk 6= state m)
, (1)
for 1 ≤ m ≤ N , where Ym
k
denotes the pixel in Yk in the
same location as state m. The relationship (1) allows Bm to
be calculated on a per-pixel basis (rather than the whole
image), and only requires access to the per-pixel proba-
bilities P (Ym
k
|xk = state m) and P (Y
m
k
|xk 6= state m).
Furthermore, using the approach described in [6], the per-
pixel measurement probabilities P (Ym
k
|xk 6= state m) and
P (Ym
k
|xk = state m) can be empirically estimated by us-
ing samples of the morphologically processed data. Specif-
ically, the per-pixel probability P (Ym
k
|xk 6= state m) can
be estimated on the basis of the statistics of the pixel value
at non-target locations in the samples of morphologically
processed data. Similarly, P (Ym
k
|xk = state m) can be
estimated on the basis of the statistics of the pixel value at
target locations in the samples of morphologically processed
data. In our experience, per-pixel probabilities estimated
from as little as 100 morphologically processed image
frames can ensure reasonable dim-target detection perfor-
mance (and we have observed that algorithm performance
is not overly sensitive to this part of the filter design).
We will delay discussion of A design until later in Section
II.D when we discuss HMM filter bank design. We next
introduce our HMM filter.
C. HMM Temporal filtering approach
The HMM temporal filtering step can be mechanised
using the forward part of the forward-backward HMM
procedure [34] as follows. For 1 ≤ m ≤ N :
1) Initialisation: Let αm
k
denote the probability
P (Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yk,xk = state m). Then
α
m
1 = pi
m
B
m (Y1).
2) Recursion: At time k > 1, set αm
k
=[∑N
n=1
α
n
k−1
A
mn
]
B
m (Yk).
so that the conditional mean filtered estimate of the state
xˆ
m
k
:= E [xk = state m|Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yk] is given by
xˆ
m
k =
α
m
k∑N
n=1
α
n
k
. (2)
Alternatively, the conditional mean estimate can be cal-
culated as [33]:
xˆk = NkBk (Yk)Axˆk−1, (3)
where Nk is a scalar normalisation factor; Bk (Yk) is a
N ×N matrix where the main diagonal is occupied by the
values of Bm (Yk) for 1 ≤ m ≤ N and all other elements
are zero; and xˆk is a N × 1 vector consisting of elements
xˆ
m
k
for 1 ≤ m ≤ N .
The following important relationships hold between filter
outputs and the measurement likelihood:
P (Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yk) =
N∑
m=1
α
m
k =
k∏
ℓ=1
1
Nℓ
. (4)
In [6], a measurement likelihood based test statistic is in-
troduced for declaring the presence of a target. The window
averaged test statistics ηk can be defined via the moving
average filter of window length of L as follows:
ηk =
(
L− 1
L
)
ηk−1 +
(
1
L
)
log
(
1
Nk
)
. (5)
At time k, if ηk exceeds a predefined threshold (a design
parameter that controls the sensitivity of the detection sys-
tem), then a target is declared to be present, and the target
is considered to be located at state
γk = argmax
m
(xˆmk ) . (6)
In [6], a window length of L = 10 was found to produce
good detection results.
D. HMM Filter Bank
Whilst a single HMM filter can provide some detec-
tion capability, previous studies have demonstrated that the
simultaneous use of multiple HMM filters organised into
a filter bank can lead to substantially improved detection
performance [24]. The performance advantage occurs be-
cause a bank of HMM filters can provide more appropriate
approximation of the range of possible target temporal
behaviors that need to be detected (in comparison to a single
HMM model that tries to provide a “lumped” compromised
description of all possible behaviors). In this paper, as
proposed in [6], [24], we evaluate a HMM filter bank
consisting of four HMM filters. Each HMM filter has the
same morphologically pre-processed image data as its input
(and there is no coupling between HMM filter intermediate
quantities).
The transition probability matrix A of each filter in the
HMM filter bank are designed based on expected target
Figure 1. Slow-motion transition patch designs.
Figure 2. Jitter handling transition patch designs.
motion. Previous studies have shown that collision-course
targets tend to manifest as relatively stationary features on
the image plane [35]. Hence, we can exploit slow-motion
transition designs for each member HMM in the filter bank
that limit target interframe motion to 1 pixel; that is, between
consecutive image frames the target either remains stationary
or moves to an adjacent neighboring pixel. For example,
consider the slow-motion transition designs illustrated by the
patches in Figure 1. For each patch, if we consider the target
to be located in the centre highlighted pixel at frame k, then
the shaded pixels represent the possible target locations at
frame k + 1.
In practice, however, a combination of factors that occur
in the airborne detection problem (such as image jitter and
frame rate limitations) degrade the effectiveness of slow-
motion transition designs. Drawing on past experiences
and insights [6], the proposed system implements the four
transition designs/patches illustrated in Figure 2 for our
HMM filter bank. These patches describe motion on the
image plane with a maximum displacement of 2 pixels per
frame, and collectively capture the range of target dynamics
likely to be encountered in our airborne data collection
experiments (a bias towards vertically upward motion in 3
of the patches is due to the target aircraft being flown at a
higher altitude than the camera aircraft (see Section III.A)).
When a HMM filtering bank is used for collision detec-
tion, a detection is declared whenever the test statistic of any
of the individual filters passes the predefined threshold. If
multiple filters simultaneously declare detection, the filter
with the largest test statistic is used to estimate target
location.
III. FLIGHT TEST RESULTS
A. Data Collection
Our approach to characterising the detection range and
false alarm performance of the morphological-HMM detec-
tion technique requires the collection of two types of image
data: 1) images containing a collision-course target/intruder
aircraft (target data); and 2) images of the airborne sky
background without any targets present (non-target data).
Our primary data collection platform is a specially modified
Cessna 172 aircraft [36] that is capable of recording image
and aircraft state data in-flight.
We used the Cessna’s externally mounted camera to
collect grayscale, 8-bit per pixel, target and non-target image
data at 15Hz with a resolution of 1024-by-768 pixels. The
camera field-of-view (FOV) was approximately 20◦-by-15◦
horizontally and vertically, respectively.
The collection of target data required the deployment of
a second aircraft to act as an intruder/target. We have con-
ducted numerous flight experiments that have, in a deliberate
but controlled manner, brought target and camera aircraft in
close proximity to each other in order to recreate realistic
collision-course scenarios. This has allowed us to capture
image data highly representative of what would be perceived
in actual airborne collision situations.
Two types of target data flight experiments were car-
ried out: 1) head-on collision experiments where aircraft
are converging from opposite directions; and 2) tail-chase
experiments aimed at replicating an overtaking collision
scenario where a faster aircraft approaches a slower aircraft
from behind. A hired Cessna 182 aircraft equipped with
an onboard GPS played the role of the target aircraft
in our experiments. State data logged on both target and
camera aircraft enabled image ego-motion compensation and
calculation of detection ranges post-flight. In total, 2 head-
on and 2 tail-chase image sequences were collected. Figures
3 and 4 are contrast enhanced samples of target images
(cropped to a size of 300-by-300 pixels) captured against
blue sky and cloudy backgrounds, respectively. The images
are roughly centered on the target, and both targets are at a
distance of approximately 1.5 km. The performance of the
morphological-HMM detection approach over the 4 target
image sets is considered in the next section.
Figure 3. Contrast enhanced sample target image against blue sky
background.
Figure 4. Contrast enhanced sample target image against cloudy back-
ground.
B. Preliminary Performance Characterisation
In the context of airborne collision detection, detection
range is an intuitive measure of performance. A long de-
tection range is desirable as it allows for more time to plan
and execute avoidance manoeuvres. However, increasing the
system sensitivity in order to achieve longer detection ranges
tends to result in more false alarms. Studies into automated
systems have shown the adverse impact of excessive false
alarms [37]. The specific concern in the airborne collision
avoidance problem is that false alarms would trigger unnec-
essary avoidance manoeuvres. Hence, a proposed detection
approach is not fit-for-purpose until a low false alarm rate
can be achieved.
The purpose of the study presented here is to characterise
the important trade-off between detection range and false
alarm rate for the morphological-HMM target detection
algorithm. We consider the effect of different background
conditions (clear ‘blue sky’ versus cluttered/cloudy) and
different collision geometries (tail-chase versus head-on).
To quantify the two sky background types used in our
Figure 5. Sample blue sky image data.
Figure 6. Sample cloudy image data.
study, we exploited some spatial gradient statistics that
have found application in cloud texture classification [38].
In particular, we calculated the mean gray-level difference
statistics for sample images drawn from our blue sky and
cloud cluttered image sequences, where larger difference
values indicate the presence of more structured cloud fields
in the image. The image in Figure 5 is representative of
our blue sky data and yielded a mean gray-level difference
of 3.4 × 10−3. The same statistic calculated for Figure 6,
which is representative of our cloud cluttered data, resulted
in a value of 5.9× 10−3. Alternatively, the gray-level pixel
variance for Figures 5 and 6 are 288 and 988, respectively,
highlighting the more inhomogeneous nature of our cloudy
data set (here, pixel variance is the variance of a row or
column vector containing the gray-level values of each pixel
in the image).
False alarm performance was characterised based on
detections induced by non-target image sequences approx-
imately 0.6 hours in length. This data length limits our
characterisation to false alarm rates no lower than 1.7 false
alarms/hour (even so, this study represents a significant im-
provement over previous investigations [6], [29], [30] which
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Figure 7. Detection distance versus false-alarm performance in sparse
cloud conditions (almost blue sky) for a Cessna 182 target aircraft (1024-
by-769 pixel image resolution; 20◦-by-15◦ camera field-of-view). The solid
line corresponds to the tail-chase case and the dashed line describes the
head-on case.
considered significantly shorter image sequences). Detection
ranges were evaluated based on detections declared on target
image sequences correlated temporally with recorded aircraft
state data. Detection range and false alarm statistics were
combined to construct the SOC curves shown in Figures 7
and 8. Each curve is based on data from one target image
sequence and one non-target image sequence (in each target
sequence, the intruder aircraft was in the camera FOV for
at least 200 consecutive frames).
Finally, for each target data set we have also evaluated a
useful signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) quantity, ∆DSNR, which
has previously been exploited in [6] to provide a measure
of detection confidence. Based on the filtering output of the
morphological-HMM detection algorithm, ∆DSNR is given
by:
∆DSNR = 20 log10
(
PT
PF
)
dB, (7)
where PT is the maximum target pixel intensity at the filter-
ing output and PF is the highest non-target pixel response
at the filtering output. The ∆DSNR value (i.e. detection
confidence) is suppressed by strong responses away from
the true target location.
Results: Figure 7 illustrates two SOC curves of the
morphological-HMM target detection approach under blue
sky background conditions. The top curve corresponds to
a tail-chase collision scenario whereas the bottom curve is
for a head-on collision scenario. Each marker on the curve
represents a specific threshold at which the target aircraft
was detected. We highlight that as the detection threshold
was increased (i.e. as we move towards the left-hand end of
the curves), the morphological-HMM algorithm eventually
reported zero false alarms. For the tail-chase scenario, this
first occurs at a range of approximately 2.62 km, and for the
head-on scenario the range was approximately 2.22 km.
We also examined detection performance under clut-
tered/cloudy sky background conditions for both tail-chase
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Figure 8. Detection distance versus false-alarm performance in cloud
clutter conditions for a Cessna 182 target aircraft (1024-by-769 pixel image
resolution; 20◦-by-15◦ camera field-of-view). The solid line corresponds
to the tail-chase case and the dashed line describes the head-on case.
and head-on collision scenarios, as illustrated in Figure 8.
Here, the morphological-HMM algorithm was able to detect
the target aircraft at a distance between 1.27 km and 1.24
km without incurring any false alarms. We note that under
the same background conditions, there was not a significant
difference in detection ranges between head-on and tail-
chase scenarios. However, a comparison of results across
different backgrounds reveals that cloud clutter backgrounds
unfortunately yielded noticeably shorter detection ranges for
similar false alarm rates. This suggests that cloud clutter
has a camouflaging effect on the target, hence requiring the
target to become more distinct (i.e. closer to the observer)
before it can be reliably detected.
We have also observed some interesting false alarm per-
formance characteristics related to image properties. The
bottom half of Figure 9 illustrates image features that tend to
generate false alarms in the morphological-HMM detection
approach; that is, cloud structures that exhibit small locally-
dark regions. In contrast, the more uniform structured clouds
in the top half of Figure 9 represent conditions far less
conducive to producing false alarms.
To put the detection distance results that we have re-
ported in the context of a real-life scenario, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) advisory circular on pilots’
role in collision avoidance suggests that a conflicting aircraft
must be detected at least 12.5 seconds prior to the time
of impact for safe collision avoidance [39]. Considering
aircraft closing speeds in our data collection experiments of
approximately 100 m/s, our results show the morphological-
HMM approach providing adequate warning in blue-sky
conditions (> 20 seconds) and borderline protection in
cloudy conditions (≈ 12 seconds).
We also highlight that Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the trade-
off relationship between detection distance and false alarm
performance. In particular, the system false alarm rate is not
fixed and varies depending on the desired detection distance
(improving detection distance can be done at the expense of
Figure 9. Image features conducive to false alarms. The locally dark cloud
features in the bottom half of the image tend to cause false alarms, whereas
the more uniform clouds structures above are less conducive to false alarms.
Table I
ZERO-FALSE-ALARM DETECTION RANGE AND DETECTION CONFIDENCE
(∆DSNR) STATISTICS FOR TARGET DATA SETS.
Background Collision Detection Detection Confidence
Type Geometry Range (km) ∆DSNR (dB)
Blue Sky
Head-on 2.22 100
Tail-chase 2.62 85
Cloudy
Head-on 1.27 145
Tail-chase 1.24 131
a higher incidence of false alarms).
Finally, Table I shows the detection ranges and cor-
responding detection confidence levels (average ∆DSNR
over 10 consecutive frames) achieved by the morphological-
HMM algorithm when no false alarms were reported. We
observe that the detection algorithm must reach a higher
confidence level to detect targets in cloud cluttered data than
in blue sky background data. Furthermore, within the same
background type, tail-chase targets tend to require lower
detection confidence levels than head-on targets.
Admittedly, more non-target data is required if we want
stronger confidence that these early, but promising, results
are truly representative of the detection algorithm’s operat-
ing characteristics. We are currently working towards the
collection of more than 20 hours of non-target data which
will eventually allow us to report evidence of system perfor-
mance with a resolution approaching 0.05 false alarms/hour
(compared to the 1.7 false alarms/hour resolution possible
with the current data set).
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the preliminary analysis of the per-
formance of a vision-based morphological-HMM airborne
collision avoidance system. This analysis suggest that, in
a moderately ‘blue sky’ environment, reliable vision-based
detection of potential head-on airborne collision with a
general aviation aircraft (ie. a Cessna aircraft) can be made at
distances out to 2.22 km (1.27 km in cluttered background
conditions), whilst experiencing false-alarms at a rate less
than 1.7 false alarms/hour (ie. less than once every 36
minutes).
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